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Jane Duncan is a national treasure, and for at 
least two decades – initially at the Freedom of 
Expression Institute, then Rhodes University 
and now University of Johannesburg (UJ), as 
well as within the Right2Know movement – she 
has played a leading public intellectual role in 
questioning society’s direction. She is a trusted 
and sincere analyst, and although her academic 
and research focus has mostly removed her 
from the media commentary circuit (to the regret 
of so many who relied on her sound, eloquent 
articulation of dissident views), it nevertheless 
gave her the space and scope to think and 
write well beyond the terrain of journalism. 
Duncan’s two recent books on repression 
and resistance – The rise of the securocrats 
(2014) and what she terms the sequel, Protest 
nation (2016)1 – allow her to grapple with the 
richest contemporary cases of social conflict 
and state malevolence. Today, the latter book 
remains the finest overview of the nature and 
scale of dissent – although her colleagues Peter 
Alexander, Trevor Ngwane, Carin Runciman 
and Luke Sinwell at UJ’s Centre for Social 
Change are doing updates based upon tens of 
thousands of even more detailed protest cases 
– while the first is now joined by Ronnie Kasrils’s 
2017 book, A simple man and Jacques Pauw’s 
The president’s keepers. 
Duncan was way ahead of her time in linking 
the crony-capitalist state to the growing 
security apparatus. Examples from the early 
2000s showed clearly that protests could beat 
repression. In 2001, at the United Nations 
World Conference Against Racism in Durban, 
there were the first inklings of mass protest 
against Thabo Mbeki’s regime and against 
mega-events. As Duncan points out, a year 
later, at the Johannesburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, the paranoia came 
into full view with repressive policing tactics. In 
late 2003 ANC leaders sided with the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) and instructed Mbeki 
to stand down on his claims that the United 
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States’ Central Intelligence Agency was working 
alongside Big Pharma multinational corporations 
to manipulate the TAC against the South African 
government – thereby forcefully reversing AIDS-
denialist policies and increasing life expectancy 
from 52 then to 64 today.
Paranoia was also evident when in May 2008, 
four months before his forced departure, Mbeki 
and even Kasrils (then minister of intelligence) 
announced that xenophobic attacks that had 
left hundreds of thousands of immigrants 
displaced were the result of an artificial ‘Third 
Force’; Mbeki had openly denied the possibility 
of xenophobia six months earlier when the 
African Peer Review Mechanism pointed out 
the dangers. In mid-2010, state paranoia about 
mass unrest, inherited and amplified by Jacob 
Zuma, led to an initial ban on protest anywhere 
near the main soccer stadiums. As Duncan 
recalls in The rise of the securocrats, ‘The fact 
that a number of marches were subsequently 
allowed during the World Cup period could be 
attributed to the negative publicity generated 
by the ban on the quality public education 
march [led by the NGO Equal Education]; what 
is not known is the extent to which the ban 
remained in effect in other parts of the country, 
and how many gatherings were affected.’ 
Still, anti-Fifa protests prior to the World Cup 
gave the government a scare: informal traders 
facing restrictions, displaced Durban fisherfolk, 
forcibly removed Cape Town residents of the N2 
Gateway project, construction workers, AIDS 
activists prevented from distributing condoms, 
environmentalists concerned about the World 
Cup’s offset ‘greenwashing’, Mbombela 
students who had lost access to schools, 
disability rights advocates, poor towns’ residents 
demanding provincial rezoning, SA Transport 
and Allied Workers and Numsa members at 
Eskom who won major wage struggles just 
before the Cup began, and, on the first days of 
play, Stallion Security workers protesting against 
labour broking and opaque payments. 
Paranoia was by now hard-wired into the 
securocrat mentality, and by August 2012, 
when 34 miners were murdered by police at 
Lonmin’s Marikana platinum mine while on 
a wildcat strike – as Duncan notes, ‘some 
allegedly in a much more premeditated fashion 
than the official account suggested’ – proof 
existed; not only in the now-notorious email 
from Cyril Ramaphosa describing the strikers as 
‘dastardly criminal’ and requesting ‘concomitant 
action’ from the cops (in 2017 he apologised for 
the wording but the stain of complicity remains). 
In addition, as one police general finally 
revealed, the main concern was the sudden 
surge in the popularity of Julius Malema, who 
had just been expelled as ANC Youth League 
leader (by a committee Ramaphosa led) and 
who would soon launch a political party to the 
ANC’s left, resulting in the 2016 ouster of the 
ANC from its rule in the Johannesburg and 
Tshwane municipalities. 
By 2014, Duncan could argue with plenty of 
evidence in The rise of the securocrats that 
the new securocrats had wormed their way 
deep into the state, in ‘a growing and unhealthy 
bureaucratisation’ of repression. Duncan was 
at the time studying, more carefully than nearly 
anyone, how police were mischaracterising 
protests and ‘Gatherings Act Incidents’. At the 
time, mid-2013, Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa 
announced that there had been 46 180 
‘protests’ (his word) from 2009–13, and ‘all 
were successfully stabilised, with 14 843 arrests 
effected’. (Does ‘successfully stabilised’ also 
apply to Marikana?)
More worrying than police mangling of 
information concerning protests is the extent of 
overkill tactics when repressing demonstrators. 
As Duncan points out in The rise of the 
securocrats, the Public Order Policing division 
desired ‘an armoured fleet of 200 Nyalas (the 
infantry mobility vehicle); pyrotechnic weaponry, 
including tear gas and stun grenades; more 
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Mpumalanga’s capital of Mbombela (Nelspruit), 
KwaZulu-Natal’s eThekwini (Durban) metro, and 
Johannesburg. Duncan’s Protest nation research 
teams at Rhodes and UJ pored over rationales, 
strategies and tactics adopted by protesters, 
and agreed on a typology of ‘non-violent, 
disruptive and violent’. This requires a further 
disaggregation of data, since the South African  
Police Service’s Incident Registration Information 
System (IRIS) database is much clumsier and 
inconsistent in identifying protests only as 
‘peaceful’ or ‘unrest-related’. It transpires that 
both municipal and national police have quirky 
modes of data collection, undermining those of 
us who have argued for an interpretation of IRIS 
Big Data to reflect South Africa as ‘protest capital 
of the world’. That may be the case, but we will 
need a more critical approach when citing IRIS 
as evidence, Duncan warns in Protest nation.
Duncan’s Protest nation literature review is 
cursory, but in search of a new theoretical frame 
for South African protest, she not only explores 
a fusion of ‘Tarrow, McAdam and Tilly’s typology 
of political opportunities and Della Porta and 
Reiter’s categories affecting policing styles’ but 
also makes a case for much wider thinking: 
‘Applying traditional social movement theorising 
to the South African case is difficult as this body 
of theory typically displays a Northern bias. This 
is because it is often synthesised from the study 
of Northern-based movements, which have often 
been conceptualised as large unitary structures.’ 
The large South African social movements that 
did emerge during the early 2000s have been 
analysed at length (e.g. in the well-known 2006 
edited collection Voices of protest by Ballard, 
Habib and Valodia), in part because many 
drew directly upon prior (anti-apartheid era) 
community or sectoral organising traditions: the 
TAC (founded in late 1998), Durban’s Concerned 
Citizens Forum (1999), the Johannesburg Anti-
Privatisation Forum (2000), and the Landless 
People’s Movement (LPM, 2001). In two 
water cannons, equipped with red and blue 
dye; video cameras for recording protests and 
other surveillance equipment; and Long-Range 
Acoustic Devices (LRADs). Commonly known 
as “sound cannons”, LRADs emit sounds that 
are painful to the human ear and can even 
cause deafness.’ With appropriate cynicism she 
comments, ‘In making their arguments for more 
resources, the police pointed to the spike in 
violent service delivery protests in the 2013/14 
financial year.’
Bearing in mind this context, Duncan focuses 
her more recent book – Protest nation – on 
‘one facet of protest in South Africa: namely, 
the right to do so’, including municipal 
bureaucratic reactions, the national policy and 
legislative milieu, and national-to-local dissent 
management by the police and politicians. 
Some of these top-down strategies leave 
Duncan bemused and outraged, such as 
Johannesburg’s pay-to-protest systems and 
Rustenburg’s protest prohibition instincts. 
Some relate to specific turf battles within 
the ruling party. Some are based on petty 
corruption, such as councillors’ ability to profit 
from housing waiting lists and sales. The list 
of micro-grievances appears endless, and it 
will take a much wider scan to allot tendencies 
to the protests. Still, using several databases, 
including media reports, Duncan skilfully recalls 
the diverse representations of many of the 
higher-profile protests during 2009–13. One of 
her concerns is how journalists flit from one to 
the other in search of drama; her penultimate 
chapter on ‘riot porn’ reporting is a vital 
antidote to what passes for news coverage of 
these grievances.
Protest nation considers thousands of protests 
in a dozen sites: the Eastern Cape’s Nelson 
Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth), Lukhanji, Makana 
and Blue Crane Route municipalities, the 
Western Cape Winelands (in part because of 
impressive farmworker protests in early 2013), 
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cases – Durban’s activists and the LPM – 
their brief rise and subsequent decline reflect 
processes observed elsewhere (e.g. in The 
city and the grassroots by Manuel Castells, 
the major scholar of 20th century urban social 
movements), in which movements are either 
successful and dissolve, or fail, leaving a 
major void. 
In Protest nation Duncan offers these 
conclusions:
If protestors have the knowledge to 
defend their rights, are located in areas 
where the intensity of struggle is low and 
media knowledge of protests is high, are 
known entities whose grievances are 
understood and even shared by state 
actors, and the state regulates protests 
administratively rather than politically 
and embraces more democratic policing 
models, then protests are more likely to 
be facilitated. Conversely, if protestors 
lack the knowledge to defend their rights, 
are located in areas where struggles are 
intense and media knowledge of protest 
rights is also low, are considered to be 
unknown entities by state actors who do 
not share their grievances and engage in 
political decision making while embracing 
authoritarian police models, then protests 
are more likely to be repressed. However, 
if repression weakens support for the 
ruling hegemonic bloc and hastens 
support for subaltern groups, then state 
actors will avoid using overt violence 
against protestors, shifting instead to 
risk-based pre-emptive measures 
designed to reduce the transformative 
potential of protests. 
These aside, what Duncan’s book confirms 
is the difficulty of generalisation about South 
African community protests. The dozen 
municipalities she examines over the 2009–13 
period in Protest nation suffered a litany of 
unique, ‘localistic’ problems, and only a few 
processes can be termed universal. The latter 
included the replacement of politicians and 
bureaucrats close to the old Mbeki order with 
those aligned to the new order, the onset of 
recession in 2009, and the rise of two new 
parties – the Congress of the People’s centre-
right breakaway from the ANC in 2008 (taking 
9% of the national vote in 2009 before melting 
down in internecine conflict) and the leftist 
Economic Freedom Fighters breakaway in 2013 
(taking 6% of the vote in 2014 elections, rising 
to 8% in 2016). There was also a sense that 
under Zuma, municipalities might be caught 
in greater patrimonial politics, procurement 
fraud and illiberal populism than under Mbeki 
– although it must be acknowledged that 
Transparency International’s records of South 
African corruption perceptions indicate much 
more rapid worsening during two prior periods: 
1996–99 (from 23rd least corrupt to 35th) under 
Nelson Mandela, and 2003–2008 under Mbeki 
(from 35th to 55th). Both Mbeki and Mandela 
adopted national economic policies considered 
exceedingly friendly to business, e.g., dropping 
crucial exchange controls, casualising the labour 
market and lowering the corporate tax rate from 
56% to 28%. 
The fine-toothed comb Duncan and her Protest 
nation research team use to explore reasons for 
protests in the dozen case sites – drawing on 
local municipal data – reveals extremely diverse 
causes. In just one case, the 1990s decision 
to cut back the national-to-local subsidies 
(what was later termed the ‘Equitable Share’ 
grant), does Duncan resort to a national-level 
explanation. Yet unmentioned is the dilemma of 
electricity protesters everywhere, whether to get 
their first connections to the grid, or to prevent 
disconnections, or to get a larger lifeline (the 
norm is a merely tokenistic 50 kWh/household/
month), or to lower prices. From 2008–13, the 
350% increase in electricity prices imposed 
by Eskom on both its direct customers and 
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municipalities would surely have amplified the 
desperation of electricity protesters?
Electricity price hikes by Eskom are just 
one of several national considerations when 
theorising protest in a Polanyian manner, i.e. 
following Karl Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ in 
which stresses caused by excessive ‘market’ 
expansion in turn create resistance. In Protest 
nation, Duncan cites parallel national concerns 
of the ‘National Intelligence Coordinating 
Committee, which coordinates the work of the 
various intelligence agencies and interprets 
intelligence for use by the state and cabinet. 
NICOC identified labour issues, political 
intolerance, service delivery protests and anti-
foreigner sentiment.’ In the same vein, Duncan 
looks for a universal process:
the ‘micro-mobilisations’ that protests 
represent are not isolated phenomena: 
they can be related to broader processes 
of social change. More specifically, in 
expansionary periods, when political 
and economic elites can afford 
democracy, they will tolerate higher 
levels of dissent, including protests. In 
such periods, they are likely to promote 
a negotiated management of protests, 
where protesting is recognised as a right 
within clearly circumscribed legal and 
institutional frameworks … 
But since 1994 – especially since 2011, at 
the peak moment of the commodity super-
cycle – the macroeconomic conditions have 
degenerated, she observes in Protest nation:
In recessionary periods, when profits 
decline, these elites are more likely to 
resort to coercion than negotiation, and 
to circumscribe the right to protest. At 
the same time, protests are likely to 
increase in frequency and intensity, as it 
is less possible for society to be held in 
equilibrium through consensus, and as 
a result social relations become more 
conflictual. South Africa is in just such a 
recessionary period.
And South Africa is not alone, Duncan argues 
in Protest nation: ‘[T]he neoliberal phase of 
capitalism precipitated a wave of protests 
reacting to the massive inequalities it produced, 
either explicitly or implicitly, around the world. 
While this wave has ebbed and flowed, it has 
been sustained for over three decades.’
It is here, indeed, that the next layer of 
correlation research might be directed. The 
Polanyian challenge in South Africa is not just 
in tracking the myriad of grievances and, where 
appropriate, correlating these to political-
economic processes so as to promote more 
linkage in analysis. More profoundly, analytical 
and strategic lacunae are obvious, correlating 
to Frantz Fanon’s critique of protests elsewhere 
on the continent: ‘For my part the deeper I enter 
into the cultures and the political circles, the 
surer I am that the great danger that threatens 
Africa is the absence of ideology.’ Admits 
Duncan in Protest nation, ‘The ideological 
character of many of the protests remains 
unclear from the data.’
That absence is the main reason that the term 
‘popcorn protest’ is valuable, in my view, i.e., 
(what I’ve defined as) the ‘tendency to flare up 
and settle down immediately; indeed, while “up 
in the air”, protesters were often subject to the 
prevailing winds, and if these were from the right 
the protests could – and often did – become 
xenophobic.’ Duncan disagrees, worrying that 
if ‘popcorn protests’ are ‘used to describe 
seemingly sporadic, spontaneous protests’, this 
‘ignores the extent of organisation that actually 
exists’. True, courageous and often sustained 
community organising is often undertaken prior 
to these service delivery protests (what Ngwane 
terms ‘all protocol observed’), but still: if there is 
no analysis, strategy and intra-protester alliance, 
then popcorn is still an appropriate concept, 
I’m afraid. Duncan’s hope in concluding 
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Protest nation is that, ‘[w]hile there is little 
evidence of these protests coalescing into 
more generalised political demands, they have 
the potential to do so if a national political 
movement comes into being that links together 
these different struggles’. 
Nevertheless, Duncan does not fully grapple 
with the dangers of localism, when far 
too many activists and analysts discuss 
grievances in a way that begins and ends 
with the municipal councillor, city manager 
or mayor. This limited perspective on state 
failure partly reflects how too many turf-
conscious leaders look inward, failing to 
grasp golden opportunities to link labour, 
community and environmental grievances and 
protests, and to think globally while acting 
locally. They see solutions mainly through 
‘quadruple-C’ demands: ending municipal 
corruption, improving delivery capacity, 
restoring competence and raising the level 
of consultation. Ignored in such demands 
are the over-determining national neoliberal 
policies (such as outsourcing and cost-
recovery) and the inadequate national-to-local 
financing provisions. 
Duncan is straightforward in her Protest nation 
objective: ‘My practical and research work 
on the right to protest has convinced me that 
there needs to be a mass movement against 
police violence and state repression and in the 
defence of democratic space more generally’, 
to which one should obviously add, and in 
pursuit of economic, social and environmental 
justice. But she is cautious about the period 
ahead: ‘The question of whether protests, 
including those in South Africa, are part of a 
revolutionary wave, rather than being isolated, 
single-country protest cycles, is an important 
one, as it speaks to whether the protests will 
fizzle out in time or escalate into fundamental 
and transformative challenges to the system on 
a worldwide scale.’
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
Notes
1  The two books were reviewed pre-publication; consequently the 
quotes and extracts from the books are not given page references 
in this review.
